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ABSTRACT 
This article considers efforts to civilianize the military justice systems in 
Canada, the United Kingdom and other countries and how these reforms 
potentially impact the role of the military commander with respect to the 
commander’s law of war obligations. One consequence of the 
“civilianization” of the military justice systems in Canada the United 
Kingdom and elsewhere potentially impacts the commander’s own personal 
criminal liability. The doctrine of command responsibility holds that a 
commander may be criminally liable for the law-of-war violations 
committed by the forces under his command if a commander fails to 
prevent, suppress, or punish law-of-war violations that he either knew about 
or was reckless or negligent in failing to notice, he can be punished as if he 
committed the underlying offenses. 
This doctrine is based on the commander’s unique position in a military 
organization. The commander is the focal point of military discipline and 
order, and it is the commander’s responsibility to maintain command and 
control of his subordinate forces. It is the commander who, by use of all the 
resources and authority available to him, ensures that his forces do not 
violate the laws of war. If those forces do, it is in large part attributable to 
the commander’s failings. 
If, as a result of the civilianization of military justice, commanders lose a 
significant portion of the disciplinary authority they have traditionally held, 
do they no longer occupy that critical position of responsibility over the 
forces under their command? If they have lost that authority, to whom does 
the law now turn to for accountability? Does the commander, who has lost 
some of his authority, lose the ability to maintain discipline through the 
military justice system, and does he find himself in a situation where he is 
given responsibility to maintain discipline and control without having 
sufficient authority to meet that obligation? This article raises and addresses 
these important questions and it provides a framework for considering 
military justice reforms that preserve the commander’s critical role in law of 
war compliance.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is not an overstatement to say that we are in the midst of a military 
justice revolution. In any examination of military justice with an eye 
towards reform, there is the notion that the traditional military justice 
system no longer works well. This notion stems from the belief that this 
system needs a reformation in order to be in line with society’s broader 
understanding of what constitutes a fair system of justice. Minor 
modifications or a tweaking of the system is not sufficient. To bring military 
justice into the modern age, many reformers have called for major overhauls 
and fundamental structural changes to the military justice system as a 
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whole. These calls for reform have been particularly prevalent in countries 
with a common law tradition. In the past several years many countries, 
including the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, have 
each undertaken significant reforms within their respective military justice 
systems.  
If there is one overarching theme to these reforms, it is a clear trend 
towards “civilianizing military justice.” By that I mean reforming military 
justice so that it mirrors the civilian justice system in that particular country 
to a much greater degree. There are a number of influences driving this 
reform. The most important of these influences come from the human rights 
community and from those who believe that a division of authority is 
essential in order for any judicial system to be considered fair. 
The human rights focus on military justice has largely been comparative. 
Reformers in this camp primarily examine the procedures and protections 
available in a given military justice system and compare those procedures 
with their respective civilian systems. To the extent that the procedures in 
the military differ and seem to provide less protection, human rights 
advocates contend that these systems should be overhauled. Much of the 
criticism does not focus on individual cases or specific examples of injustice 
within the military justice system. Rather, the assumption is that if these 
processes differ and seem less protective of individual rights than the 
protections which exist in the civilian system, then military justice is 
inherently unfair and must be brought in line with the civilian system.  
Other reformers gauge the fairness of a particular military justice system 
by focusing on how authority is divided within the system. For example, are 
the key decisions on the disposition and adjudication of cases given to a 
single authority? Those who focus on these questions can be referred to as 
separation of powers reformers. They are critical of military justice systems 
that give a single office, typically the military commander, the absolute 
authority to decide which service members to bring to trial, what offenses to 
charge, and the final disposition of the case. Like the human rights 
reformers, separation of power reformers have not focused on proving 
injustices in specific cases, but instead have argued that a system where so 
much power rests in one office is inherently unfair and therefore must 
change. 
Over the past several years, influence from the human rights reformers 
and the separation of powers reformers have converged and both camps 
have identified several unique aspects of traditional military justice systems 
for reform. One such aspect is lack of tenure for military judges. In most 
traditional military justice systems judges have been drawn from the ranks 
and have been appointed to serve on military courts on an ad hoc basis. 
Military judges traditionally do not enjoy any special tenure protection and 
can be removed or reassigned at any time. The concern is that in such a 
system, military judges will conform their decisions to what they believe are 
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the desires of the commander who both appointed them and convened the 
military court in order to ensure favorable professional advancement.  
Another area of focus for reformers is the selection process of the 
military members empanelled to sit on courts-martial. In many traditional 
military justice systems, the military commander personally selects the 
military officers who will sit in judgment of the accused service member. 
Because this is the same commander who determines that a service member 
should face a court-martial, the concern is that the commander will select 
the members who will reach the outcome that the commander desires, 
regardless of the facts presented at trial. Additionally, there has been some 
concern that the commander will assert undue influence over the members 
of the court-martial.  
A third area of criticism is the lack of a robust appellate process. In 
traditional military justice systems, an appellate process is either non-
existent or very limited in scope. Often, the appellate authority is the same 
commander that convened the court-martial. Appeals outside of the chain of 
command are either not allowed, or are so limited in scope that the 
convicted service member has no real redress for errors or injustices that 
may have occurred in that service member’s court-martial.  
There has been much written on each of these specific aspects of military 
justice reform over the past several years. However, one overarching aspect 
of each of these and most other reform efforts has been the central role of 
the commander within traditional military justice systems. As the court in 
Généreux noted about the then-existing military justice system in Canada, 
there must be institutional independence with respect to matters of 
administration that relate directly to the tribunal’s judicial function, such as 
assignment of judges, sittings of the court, and court lists.1 In that case, the 
Judge Advocate General who appointed military judges on an ad hoc basis 
was also an agent of the executive branch, leading the court to conclude that 
the appointment process lacked sufficient independence from the 
executive.2 The Généreux court disapproved of a system that allowed the 
convening authority to determine when a General Court-Martial would take 
place, to appoint the members who would hear the case, to decide how 
many members would hear the case, and to appoint the prosecutor who 
would represent the executive at the court-martial. 
 The focus of this paper is on the overarching theme – the role of the 
military commander in the traditional military justice system. The first part 
of the paper looks at the reforms which have taken place in the United 
Kingdom, Canada, and Australia. Next, the paper examines the role of the 
commander in the United States military justice system and why the United 
States gives the commander such a central role in military justice. This 
section also highlights some of the calls for reforming the U.S. system. The 
  
 1. R. v. Généreux, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 259, 286 (Can.). 
 2. Id. at 302. 
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next section discusses the obligations and responsibilities that a commander 
has under the law of armed conflict (LOAC) to ensure that their forces 
comply with the laws of war. The paper next asks whether the reforms 
which significantly reduce the role of the commander with respect to 
military justice have adequately considered the commander’s obligations 
under the LOAC. In the last section, the paper identifies those features of 
military justice where the commander’s continued involvement is essential 
if the commander is to meet his LOAC obligations. This section also 
identifies those areas where reforms can and should be made without 
diminishing the commander’s essential functions within the military 
institution itself.  
I. RECENT EFFORTS AT REFORMING THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
COMMANDER 
Reformers have accomplished significant structural changes to many 
military justice systems, particularly in countries with a shared common law 
tradition. Nowhere have these changes been more significant than in Canada 
and the United Kingdom. There are also ongoing efforts for reform in 
Australia, as well as continued calls for reform in the United States. While 
these are certainly not the only countries undergoing military justice 
reforms, they provide useful examples for this discussion. Some of the 
reform efforts have gone beyond changing the role of the military 
commander, but the commander’s role in military justice remains at the 
heart of most reforms and it will be the focus of this section.  
A. Canada 
The changes in the Canadian military justice system came as a result of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion in the case of Michel Généreux.3 
Généreux was tried by a military court-martial where he was convicted of 
one count of possessing illegal drugs, two counts of possession for the 
purpose of trafficking, and one count of being absent without leave.4 He was 
sentenced to fifteen months imprisonment and given a dishonorable 
discharge from the Army.5 
Généreux first appealed his conviction through the military appeals 
system and then through the Canadian federal courts. The case reached the 
Supreme Court of Canada on the following issues relevant to this 
discussion: 
  
 3. See id. at 259.  
 4. Id. at 272. 
 5. Id. 
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1. Do sections 166 to 170 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-
5, as amended, and the Queen’s Regulations and Orders, inasmuch as they 
allow an accused to be tried by General Court Martial, restrict the 
accused’s right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal guaranteed by sections 7 and 11(d) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms? 
2. If the answer to question 1 is yes, are they reasonable limits in a free 
and democratic society and therefore justified under section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore not inconsistent 
with the Constitution Act, 1982? 
3. Does section 130 of the National Defence Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5, as 
amended, restrict the right to equality protected by section 15 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in that it confers jurisdiction 
over a person subject to the National Defence Act for offences pursuant to 
the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-1, as amended, thereby 
depriving the accused of the procedure normally applicable to such 
offences? 
4. If the answer to question 3 is yes, is it a reasonable limit in a free and 
democratic society and therefore justified under s. 1 of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore not inconsistent with the 
Constitution Act, 1982?6 
In taking up these issues, the court first noted that the Canadian military 
justice system has a purpose beyond just maintaining discipline and 
integrity in the armed forces.7 The Canadian National Defence Act also 
makes any act or omission punishable under the Canadian Criminal Code or 
Act of Parliament an offense under the Code of Service Discipline.8 Thus, 
the Canadian military justice system also serves one of the purposes of 
ordinary criminal courts—to punish wrongful conduct which threatens 
public order and welfare.9 Because the military justice system shares a 
  
 6. Id. at 279–80. Section 1 of the Charter provides: “The Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such 
reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic 
society.” Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c. 11, § 1 
(U.K.), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/charter/. Section 7 of the Charter provides: 
“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be 
deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” Id. at § 7. 
Section 11(d) of the Charter provides: “Any person charged with an offence has the right to 
be presumed innocent until proven guilty according to law in a fair and public hearing by an 
independent and impartial tribunal.” Id. 
 7. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 281. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id.  
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purpose with its civilian counterparts, the court held that constitutional 
principles are applicable to the military court system.10 
In Généreux’s appeal no evidence was proffered, and the court did not 
consider any evidence suggesting that the court-martial hearing his case was 
actually biased.11 Instead, the court sought to determine whether a 
reasonable person would have been satisfied that the court-martial system 
existing at the time was independent.12 According to the court, in order to be 
independent, “[t]he status of the tribunal . . . must guarantee . . . freedom 
from interference by the executive and legislative branches” as well as other 
external forces.13 
The court set out three specific criteria to evaluate the independence of 
the military court-martial system. The first criterion that the court examined 
was “security of tenure.”14 According to the court, “[w]hat is essential is that 
the decision-maker be removable only for cause.”15 Second, the “decision-
maker [must] have a basic degree of financial security” so that their salary 
and pension are not subject to arbitrary interference in a manner that could 
affect judicial independence.16 Finally, there must be “institutional 
independence with respect to matters of administration that relate directly to 
the . . . tribunal’s judicial function . . . [such as] assignment of judges, 
sittings of the court and court lists.”17 
The court examined the structure of the court-martial system in light of 
these standards. In doing so, the court identified the responsibility placed on 
the commander for matters of discipline. The court also considered the role 
of the judge advocate in a general court-martial. The judge advocate is a 
legally trained officer with several years of experience and is appointed 
from a pool of military judges to preside over the court and function as a 
trial judge.18 In Canada, the judge advocate, by historical practice, is a 
member of the Canadian military and serves on an ad hoc basis. The judge 
advocate is appointed to the general court-martial by the Judge Advocate 
General upon the recommendation of the Chief Judge Advocate.19 
According to the Généreux court, it was this system of appointing 
military judges to general courts-martial which violated Section 11(d) of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.20 The Judge Advocate General 
who appointed the military judges on an ad hoc basis was an agent of the 
  
 10. See id. at 281-82. 
 11. See id. at 284. 
 12. Id. at 287. 
 13. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 283-84. 
 14. Id. at 285. 
  15. Id. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 286. 
 18. Id. at 299-301. 
 19. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 301-02. 
  20. Id. at 302. 
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executive, and the appointment process lacked sufficient independence from 
the executive.21 In addition, because the appointment was done on a case by 
case basis, there was no objective guarantee that a military judge’s career 
would not be affected by his or her past decisions.22 
The court next looked at the financial security of the members 
participating in courts-martial. At the time of Généreux’s trial, “[t]here were 
no . . . prohibitions . . . against evaluating an officer on the basis of his or 
her performance at a [g]eneral [c]ourt-[m]artial.”23 Likewise, there was no 
prohibition on evaluating a judge advocate based on his or her performance 
at a general court-martial.24 According to the court, a commander could 
reward or punish members who served on a court-martial by either 
commenting favorably or unfavorably on their performance.25 Because those 
performance evaluations had a significant impact on future promotions and 
assignments, the court held that a reasonable person could conclude that 
members of a court-martial lacked sufficient financial security and 
independence from the commander.26 
Lastly, the Généreux court examined the broader characteristics of the 
general court-martial system and determined that there was insufficient 
institutional independence to satisfy the requirements of Section 11(d) of 
the Canadian Charter.27 The court disapproved of a system that allowed the 
convening authority to determine when a general court-martial would take 
place,28 appoint the members who would hear the case,29 decide how many 
members would hear the case,30 and appoint the prosecutor who would 
represent the executive at the court-martial.31 
After noting these deficiencies, the court then analyzed whether any 
exception to the requirements of Section 11(d) of the charter was justified 
under Section 1. Here, it provided an analysis that relied on a balancing test 
previously set out in Regina v. Oakes.32 Under this test, limitations on 
constitutional rights must be justified by important and overriding 
governmental concerns.33 Next, the means chosen to restrict the rights must 
be reasonable.34 Applying this test, the court recognized again that one of 
the primary purposes of the separate military justice system was to maintain 
  
  21. Id. at 303-04. 
  22. Id. at 304-05. 
 23. Id. at 306. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 306-07. 
 26. Id. at 307. 
 27. Id. at 309-10. 
 28. Id. at 309. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 309. 
 32. Id. at 312-13; see also R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 105-06 (Can.).  
 33. Oakes, 1 S.C.R. at 105-06. 
 34. Id. at 106.  
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a high level of discipline, an important interest.35 However, without further 
analysis, the court held that a military tribunal that does not comply with the 
requirements of Section 11(d) of the Charter would only satisfy the second 
prong of the Oakes test in the most extraordinary circumstances, such as a 
period of war or insurrection.36 
The Généreux holding invalidated many of the provisions of the 
Canadian military justice system relating to the commander’s role. In 
response, Canada rewrote much of its military code.37 In fact, revisions to 
the military code began while the Généreux case was making its way 
through the appellate process. Changes that had already occurred by the 
time Généreux reached the Canadian Supreme Court included limited tenure 
for military judges, allowing them to remain in that position for two to four 
years.38 Further, military judges are no longer appointed to a specific case 
by the Judge Advocate General; instead, they are appointed by the Chief 
Military Trial Judge.39 In addition, an officer’s performance as a member of 
a general court-martial can no longer be used to determine his qualification 
for promotion or rate of pay.40 In dicta, the court in Généreux commented 
favorably on these changes.41 
However, the most significant aspects of the role of the convening 
authority were unchanged when Généreux was decided.42 Changes 
following Généreux altered the traditional role of the military commander 
so that commanders could no longer conduct a summary action on a case 
which they have personally investigated.43 While a commander still has the 
authority to bring charges, the military police also has independent authority 
to investigate serious and sensitive cases, and it too can bring charges 
independent of the military commander.44 The accused now has the right to 
elect trial by court-martial in all but very minor cases.45 Summary court 
jurisdiction has also been limited to minor offenses.46 The authority to 
appoint prosecutors to individual cases has been given to the newly created 
Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP).47 The DMP, not the commander, 
is now “responsible for . . . referring . . . all charges to be tried by court-
  
 35. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 313.  
 36. Id. at 313. 
 37. See Jerry S.T. Pitzul & John C. Maguire, A Perspective on Canada’s Code of 
Service Discipline, 52 A.F.L. REV. 1, 9 (2002). 
 38. Généreux, 1 S.C.R. at 305.  
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 307. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Pitzul & Maguire, supra note 37, at 10. 
 43. See National Defense Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.N-5 (Can.). 
 44. See id.  
 45. Id. § 162.1. 
 46. Id. § 164(1). 
 47. Id. § 165.11. 
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martial.”48 The DMP determines the type of court-martial that will hear the 
charges.49 Court members are now selected by a Court-Martial 
Administrator at the request of the DMP.50 In most cases, the military 
commander is required to refer the case to the DMP along with a 
recommended disposition.51 Commanders still have the authority not to 
proceed with a case, but they no longer have the jurisdiction to dismiss a 
case.52 In cases where the commander has decided not to proceed with a 
charge, military police can refer a charge to the referral authority 
independent of the military commander.53 
These changes to the traditional role of the military commander reflect a 
convergence of Canada’s military and civilian criminal justice processes. 
The net effect of this convergence is that the military commander now has 
much less control and involvement in the court-martial process. Much of the 
decision-making has been turned over to lawyers, judges, and other officials 
with legal training but who do not hold the mantel of command. 
B. The United Kingdom 
The 1990s also saw a revolution in the military justice system of the 
United Kingdom which, like Canada, made major changes in response to 
judicial opinions.54 In the case of the United Kingdom, however, the judicial 
opinions came from the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).55 
Individuals can bring an action against a State in this court if they believe 
the State has violated rights guaranteed to them under the European 
Convention or its protocols.56 If the individual succeeds, he or she is entitled 
to monetary compensation.57 More importantly, if the court determines that 
the State has violated the European Convention or its protocols, the State 
must modify its law or practice according to the decision.58 In addition, 
other signatories to the European Convention will often modify their 
domestic laws and practices to avoid similar cases being brought against 
them.59 
  
 48. Id.  
 49. Id. § 165.14. 
 50. Id. § 165.19. 
 51. Id. § 164.2(1).  
 52. Id. §§ 163.1(2), 164.1(2). 
 53. Id. § 164.1(3). 
 54. Simon P. Rowlinson, The British System of Military Justice, 52 A.F. L. REV. 17, 
18-19 (2002). 
 55. Id. at 19. 
 56. See Peter Rowe, A New Court To Protect Human Rights in the Armed Forces of 
the UK: The Summary Appeal Court, 8 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 201, 203 (2003).  
 57. Id.  
 58. Id. at 202. 
 59. Id. at 215. 
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This was the context in which the case of Findlay v. United Kingdom60 
came to the ECHR. Alexander Findlay, a British citizen, was a member of 
the Scots Guard.61 In July 1990, Findlay held members of his own unit at 
gun point and threatened to kill himself and some of his colleagues.62 
Findlay was tried by a general court-martial and pled guilty to assault, 
conduct prejudice to good order and military discipline, and threatening to 
kill another person.63 He was sentenced to two years’ imprisonment, a 
reduction in rank, and dismissal from the army.64 He unsuccessfully 
petitioned for a reduction in his sentence through both the military and 
civilian courts.65 
Ultimately, Findlay brought his case before the ECHR. He claimed that 
the court-martial system under which he was tried violated Article 6 of the 
European Convention because, among other things, it did not provide him 
with an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.66 The court 
examined the Army Act of 1955 and applicable rules of procedure to 
determine if those procedures complied with the European Convention.67 
At the time of Findlay’s case, a soldier could be tried by a district, field, 
or general court-martial.68 A general court-martial consisted of a President 
and at least four other army officers, including a judge advocate.69 Military 
commanders at certain levels of command were also convening officers. 
The convening officer decided the nature and the detail of the charges to be 
  
 60. Findlay v. United Kingdom, App. No. 2210/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 221 (1997). 
 61. Id. at 224. 
 62. Id. at 224-25. 
 63. Id. at 227. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 228. 
 66. Findlay, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 233. Article 6, paragraph 1 of the European 
Convention states:  
In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public 
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly 
but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial 
in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a 
democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection 
of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly 
necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where 
publicity would prejudice the interests of justice. 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 
6(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. 
 67. Findlay, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 229-32. As the case was pending, the United 
Kingdom had already begun significant revisions to its justice system with regard to the role 
of the military commander. While the court did not rule on these changes, it did comment 
favorably on many of them. 
 68. Id. at 229. 
 69. Id. 
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brought and the type of court-martial required.70 The convening authority 
was also responsible for convening the court.71 The convening officer would 
specify the place and time of the trial.72 He appointed the President and 
other members of the court and ensured that the judge advocate appointed 
the prosecutors and the defense counsel.73 The convening authority also 
provided the prosecutor with an abstract of the evidence in the case.74 He 
ensured that the accused had proper representation and sufficient time to 
prepare for trial.75 The convening officer could dissolve the court-martial 
either before or during the trial and could also comment on the proceeding 
of the court-martial to the members of the court.76 The convening officer 
also ensured the availability of all witnesses at trial.77 No trial was final until 
it was confirmed by a confirming officer.78 In most cases, this confirming 
officer was the same commander who served as the convening officer.79 
After final action, the accused could petition reviewing officials within the 
military chain of command for review.80 The reviewing officials received 
legal advice from the Judge Advocate General’s office; however, that 
advice was not made public, and the reviewing officials were not required to 
give any reasons for their decision.81 A Court-Martial Appeal Court 
consisting of civilian judges heard appeals of convictions, but no such 
appeal was available for an accused who pled guilty.82 
The ECHR found that this system violated the requirements under 
Article 6 for an independent and impartial tribunal in several regards. All 
officers of the court-martial were appointed by and directly subordinate to 
the convening officer, who also performed the role of prosecuting 
authority.83 Additionally, because that same officer served as the confirming 
officer and no case was final until confirmed by him, this system raised 
serious doubts as to the independence of the tribunal from the prosecuting 
authority.84 The court also stated that any involvement by the judge 
advocate and any oath requirements were not sufficient to dispel the doubts 
as to the tribunal’s independence and impartiality.85 The court reasoned that 
  
 70. Id. at 230. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73.  Findlay, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 230. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 231–32. 
 79. Findlay, 24 Eur. H.R. at 231-32. 
 80. Id. at 232. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 240. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Findlay, 24 Eur. H.R. at 239. 
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in order for the tribunal to be impartial it “must be subjectively free [from] 
personal prejudice [and] bias . . . [and] must also be impartial from an 
objective viewpoint.”86 In essence, the ECHR held that because of “the 
central role played by the convening officer” in the court-martial structure, 
the system violated Article 6 of the Charter.87 
Even before Findlay’s case was decided by the ECHR, the United 
Kingdom had begun to restructure its court-martial system. In this 
restructuring process, the United Kingdom adopted a system similar to the 
Canadian model. These changes had the collective effect of significantly 
reducing the role of the commander in their particular system of military 
justice. Changes in the United Kingdom began with the Armed Forces Act 
of 1996. Under that Act, the role of the convening officer was abolished. In 
its place, those functions were divided into three separate bodies: the higher 
authority, the prosecuting authority, and the court administration.88 “The 
higher authority [is] a senior officer [who] decide[s] whether . . . case[s] 
referred to him by the accused’s commanding officer should be dealt with 
summarily, referred to the new prosecuting authority, or dropped.”89 “Once 
the higher authority has [made that] decision, he or she has no further 
involvement in the case.”90 If the case is referred to the prosecuting 
authority, that authority has absolute discretion to decide whether to 
prosecute the case, which charges to be brought, and what level of court-
martial will hear the case.91 The prosecuting authority will often consider 
the views of the higher authority and the accused’s commander when 
making this determination.92 The prosecuting authority also “conduct[s]” the 
“prosecution.”93 
If the case is referred to a court-martial, the court administrator is 
responsible for arranging the trial.94 This includes selecting members, 
ensuring the availability of witnesses, and selecting the time and venue for 
the case.95 “Officers under the command of the higher authority will not be 
selected as members of the court martial.”96 After trial, a reviewing 
authority conducts a single review of each case, and the reviewing authority 
must publish the reasons for his decisions.97 “The reviewing authority has 
the power to quash a finding” and related sentence.98 He also has the power 
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to substitute a finding of guilt on a lesser offense and substitute a sentence 
less severe than the original sentence.99 The reviewing authority may also 
authorize a retrial.100 During the review process, the reviewing authority will 
receive advice from the judge advocate.101 The role of confirming officer 
was abolished.102 
In addition to these changes under the Armed Forces Discipline Act of 
2000, the Summary Appeal Court was created to review cases of which the 
commander disposed by summary action. This “court is composed of a 
judge advocate and two Army officers.” “The appeal is by way of rehearing 
in open court,” and the court must provide the reasons for the finding and 
sentence.103 There have been additional changes and reforms to the United 
Kingdom’s system since that time, but the structural changes made 
following the Findlay case remain in place. 
C. Australia 
Unlike the United Kingdom and Canada, the modernization of military 
justice in Australia resulted primarily from legislative initiatives rather than 
from judicial opinions. In 1982, Australia enacted the Defense Force 
Discipline Act (DFDA). Much like the reforms that took place in the United 
States immediately after World War II, the DFDA established “a uniform 
system of military justice, which applied to all three military branches.”104 
Among other things, the DFDA set out the role of the convening authority. 
The convening authority is an officer appointed by either the Chief of the 
Defense Force or a service chief.105 Relevant to this discussion, the 
convening authority had several responsibilities. These responsibilities 
included convening ad hoc courts-martial to hear particular charges, 
appointing the court-martial legal officer, and appointing the members who 
sit in judgment of the accused service member.106 In many ways the role of 
the convening authority under the DFDA looked very similar to the 
traditional role of the convening authority in other countries with a common 
law tradition. 
Beginning in the late 1990s a number of studies and committees formed 
to examine military justice under the DFDA.107 In 2001, what came to be 
known as the Burchett Report recommended replacing the role of the 
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convening authority with a Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) and the 
Registrar of Military Justice (RMJ). The DMP would be responsible for 
charging and prosecution and the RMJ would be responsible for the 
administration of trials.108 These recommended changes became portions of 
the 2005 amendments to the DFDA.109 The underlying rationale for these 
reforms was to reduce the influence of the chain of command on the 
decision to prosecute and increase the level of expertise in the trial 
process.110 The removal of the convening authority and dividing those 
responsibilities among other offices within the military structure is very 
similar to the changes that took place in the United Kingdom and Canada 
following the Findlay and Genereux cases. 
Many of the reforms in Australia, however, were short lived. In 2009, the 
High Court of Australia invalidated one of the key centerpieces of the 2005 
reforms by striking down the Australian Military Court (AMC). The Court’s 
decision in Lane v. Morrison held that the creation and powers granted to 
the AMC violated Chapter III of the Australian Constitution.111 The Lane 
decision has thrown many of the reforms in Australia in flux, and as of yet 
no legislative fix has been implemented. It is beyond the scope of this 
article to delve into the interesting details of the Lane case and the 
constitutional challenges facing military justice reform in Australia. What is 
important is to see that Australia, like the United Kingdom, Canada, and 
other common law countries have, as a key component of their reform 
efforts, made attempts at significantly reducing or eliminating the traditional 
role that the military commander plays in the military justice system.  
II. THE UNITED STATES MILITARY JUSTICE SYSTEM AND CALLS FOR 
REFORM 
In many ways, the United States was at the forefront of military justice 
reform in the 20th Century. At the conclusion of World War II, many of the 
returning service members complained about the arbitrariness, unfairness, 
and abuse they suffered under the then-existing court-martial system. The 
U.S. Congress responded by holding several years of hearings and other 
inquiries. These efforts ultimately led to the creation of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice (UCMJ), which was signed into law in 1951. It is 
interesting to note that the reforms reflected in the new UCMJ did not come 
in response to specific court cases or other judicial rulings. U.S. federal 
courts and the Supreme Court have traditionally been highly deferential to 
the interests of the military and have not been a primary source for reform 
of the U.S. military justice system. Rather, the impetus for the reforms 
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found in the UCMJ came from service members through their elected 
representatives in Congress.  
The UCMJ was a compromise between proponents of individual rights 
and those who wanted to retain the commander as a source of virtually 
unlimited control over military justice.112 Since the enactment of the code in 
1951, there have been two significant amendments to the code, one in 
1968113 and another in 1983.114 
The UCMJ placed several limits on the influence that a commander 
could assert over the court-martial process while also providing individual 
soldiers with greater rights and protections than they had traditionally 
enjoyed prior to the enactment of the UCMJ. Some of the significant 
systemic changes included the establishment of the Military Service Courts 
of Review,115 the creation of a civilian Court of Appeals,116 and the 
possibility of review of military cases by the Supreme Court.117 Other 
significant systemic reforms included the creation of the position of the 
military trial judge and the creation of the trial judiciary to appoint judges to 
individual courts-martial.118 Article 37 of the UCMJ prevents those 
participating in the court-martial, including the military judge, attorneys, 
and members, from suffering adverse personnel actions based on their 
participation in the court-martial.119 A number of other protections were put 
into place to prevent the risk of the commander attempting to unlawfully 
influence the court-martial process.120 
While these reforms were designed to limit a commander’s ability to 
unlawfully influence a case, there are several areas where the commander 
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still has the legal authority to assert command and control over the process. 
Under the current version of the UCMJ, the commander still has extensive 
power in investigating and charging soldiers, in conducting summary 
disciplinary actions, and in managing the court-martial process. 
Before trial, the commander has the authority to order investigations into 
misconduct.121 Each service has an established regulatory process that 
allows the commander to appoint individuals and boards to conduct 
investigations.122 In addition, each service has investigative agencies that 
have the authority to conduct investigations on matters from minor 
infractions to the most serious offenses.123 None of these agencies, however, 
has the independent authority or ability to dispose of a criminal charge 
against a service member under the UCMJ. Only a commander of that 
service member has the authority to dispose of the case. This disposition can 
be achieved by dismissing the charges, adjudicating the charges within the 
commander’s level of authority, or forwarding the charges to a superior 
commander.124 Commanders are assisted by their legal advisors throughout 
this process, but it is the commander alone who decides the disposition of 
the case. 
In addition, the UCMJ gives commanders significant authority to 
conduct non-judicial punishment125 and summary courts-martial rather than 
referring the case to a general or special court-martial. Briefly, non-judicial 
punishment under Article 15 of the UCMJ allows the commander to be the 
sole adjudicator of charges brought by the commander against the service 
member. In this proceeding, the commander serves as the finder of fact, 
deciding first the guilt or innocence of the accused; if the accused is found 
guilty, it imposes any punishment within that commander’s level of 
authority. Depending on the rank of the service member involved and the 
rank of the commander imposing punishment, such punishment can include 
reductions in rank, restriction on the accused’s liberty for up to forty-five 
days, imposition of extra duty for up to forty-five days, correctional custody 
for up to thirty consecutive days, and forfeitures of pay.126 Although in most 
cases the service member has the right to refuse adjudication under Article 
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15127 and demand trial by court-martial, a significant number of cases within 
the military are disposed of under this process.128 Under Article 15, a service 
member has only a limited appeal to the next superior commander within 
the chain of command.129 Punishments under Article 15 are administrative 
in nature and are not considered to be criminal convictions.130 
In addition to non-judicial punishment power, commanders also have the 
authority to convene summary courts-martial.131 In a summary court, the 
commander appoints an officer within the command to serve as the 
summary court officer. At a summary court, the court officer is the finder of 
fact. If the accused is found guilty, the summary court officer will impose a 
sentence that could include up to one month confinement, reduction in rank, 
and forfeiture of pay.132 As with non-judicial punishment, the service 
member can refuse to have his case adjudicated by a summary court and can 
instead demand trial by court-martial.133 Summary court convictions are not 
considered to be criminal convictions.134 
In cases of general and special courts-martial, the commander also has 
considerable authority to assert command control over the court-martial 
process.135 The commander ultimately decides which cases are tried at a 
special or general court-martial. Not only does the commander decide if the 
service member will be tried by a special or a general court-martial, but if 
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the accused elects to be tried by a military panel rather than a military judge, 
the commander selects the members who will hear the case. Under Article 
25 of the UCMJ, the commander is charged with personally selecting those 
members who in his opinion are “best qualified for the duty by reason of 
age, education, training, experience, length of service, and judicial 
temperament.”136 
Beyond the selection of the members, the commander/convening 
authority137 has several significant functions during the course of the trial. 
The convening authority can order depositions to be taken in a pending 
case.138 The convening authority approves and authorizes funding for 
witness travel139 as well as the employment and funding of expert witnesses 
requested by either the prosecution or the defense.140 The convening 
authority is authorized to grant both transactional and testimonial immunity 
for any witness subject to the UCMJ.141 If the accused service-member 
desires to enter a guilty plea, any pretrial agreement is negotiated between 
the service member and the convening authority directly and is binding on 
the court.142 The convening authority can also order an inquiry into the 
mental capacity or mental responsibility of the accused service member.143 
At the conclusion of the trial, if the service member is found guilty of 
any offense, the convening authority continues to have significant 
involvement in the case. Before the case becomes final, the convening 
authority must approve both the findings and the sentence of the court-
martial.144 “At that time, the convening authority may dismiss any charge or 
specification by setting aside findings of guilt,”145 change the findings of 
guilt to a “lesser included offense,”146 modify the sentence to any lesser 
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sentence, or “order a proceeding in revision or rehearing.”147 No proceeding 
in revision can reconsider a finding of not guilty.148 The commander’s 
authority to modify the findings and sentence in this manner is viewed as “a 
matter of command prerogative involving the sole discretion of the 
convening authority.”149 
In light of the significant role that the commander continues to play 
under the UCMJ structure, many today see the U.S. lagging behind the 
wave of reform that has taken place in Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
elsewhere. One of the most influential voices for reform is from what has 
been referred to as the Cox Commission. This commission was sponsored 
by the National Institute of Military Justice and chaired by Walter T. Cox 
III, a former judge on the United States Court of Military Appeals, now 
named the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces.150 The work of the 
commission coincided with the fiftieth anniversary of the UCMJ and was 
intended to be a “bottom up” review of military justice and to examine a 
system that, in the opinion of the commission, had failed to keep pace with 
the changes within the U.S. military and with the changes taking place in 
other countries’ military justice systems.151 
After conducting numerous hearings and reviewing testimony from a 
wide range of perspectives, the Cox Commission recommended several 
changes to the current UCMJ related to the role of the military 
commander.152 First, the Cox Commission recommended modifying the 
pretrial role of the military commander.153 Specifically, the commission 
recommended removing the commander from the panel selection process 
and randomizing the selection of court members.154 This recommendation 
was certainly not something new and has remained one of the most hotly 
debated aspects of the UCMJ since its inception in 1951.155 
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The Cox Commission also recommended removing the commander from 
other pretrial processes such as the approval of witness travel for pretrial 
hearings, the approval of funding for expert witnesses and expert assistance, 
and the approval of funding for pretrial investigative assistance.156 The Cox 
Commission asserted that under the current system the convening authority 
is too involved in these decisions, and there is a risk the commander could 
“withhold or grant approval [of these requests] based on personal preference 
rather than a legal standard.”157 Though the report does not cite a significant 
number of instances where convening authorities actually made these 
decisions on a basis other than a legal standard, the commission was 
nonetheless concerned that such a risk existed.158 
To replace some of the functions currently performed by the convening 
authority, the Cox Commission and others have called for a greater role for 
lawyers and military judges.159 Because courts-martial are convened on an 
ad hoc basis,160 there are no standing trial courts a service member can 
petition prior to the formal convening of a court-martial.161 The Cox 
Commission recommended the establishment of standing judges to replace 
the convening authority in deciding pretrial petitions such as witness 
funding, employment of experts, and the provision of pretrial investigative 
assistance.162 
In addition to these suggestions there have also been calls for increasing 
the independence of military judges by giving these judges some form of 
tenure.163 The calls for tenure have come from both within and outside of 
the military and have increased since the Supreme Court’s decision in 
United States v. Weiss.164 The rationale for some form of judicial tenure is to 
enhance the independence of the trial judiciary.165 According to some 
critics, there is at least the perception that commanders can influence the 
Judge Advocate General to remove or reassign a military judge for an 
unpopular or unfavorable decision.166  
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Another reform affecting the authority of the military commander is the 
call to abolish summary courts-martial.167 Currently, summary courts are a 
tool of the military commander to quickly adjudicate and impose swift 
punishment for relatively minor offenses.168 Calls for the abolition of these 
courts is based on the belief that these courts are overly vulnerable to 
command influence and do not provide sufficient procedural protections for 
service members facing a summary court.169 
In spite of the pressures for reform, the U.S. Congress has not engaged in 
any sweeping reforms as of yet. While modifications and amendments to 
the UCMJ and the rules for court-martial occur on a regular basis, these 
amendments have not significantly changed the role that the commander 
plays in the justice system. Much of the resistance for systemic change 
comes from within the military itself. Like any institution, the U.S. military 
is slow to change or embrace sweeping reform. Those who favor the current 
system and the role that the military commander plays often articulate their 
preference for the current system in non-specific general terms. These 
individuals frequently claim that removing or significantly limiting the 
commander’s role in military justice would undermine good order and 
discipline within the military.170 Unfortunately, these sweeping claims do 
little to articulate specifically why it is essential for the commander to 
maintain broad control over the system and why limiting the commander’s 
functions would undermine good order and discipline. Those who wish to 
preserve the status quo often seem to argue that since this is the way that 
military justice has always been administered in the past, it therefore should 
be maintained as such in the future.  
III. THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY COMMANDER AND THE LAW OF ARMED 
CONFLICT 
In order to better assess whether resistance to the kind of reforms that 
have taken place in Canada, the United Kingdom, and elsewhere has any 
merit, relying solely on broad claims that these reforms will harm good 
order and discipline is simply not enough. Instead, it is important to 
consider more fully and carefully why it is that the commander has had such 
a key role in military justice matters. Certainly some rationale for placing 
the commander at the head of military justice system derives from the fact 
that the commander needs to control all aspects of military operations if he 
is to be effective. But if this is the only reason for the commander to remain 
at the apex of military justice, then perhaps the kinds of reforms that have 
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taken place in many countries are justified because there are other offices 
and processes that most certainly can preform criminal justice functions as 
effectively as the military commander and in a way that provides greater 
protections for the accused service member.  
However, a critical aspect that often goes unrecognized in most reform 
efforts is an examination of the military commander’s responsibilities under 
the law of armed conflict. Efforts to reform military justice, to better align it 
with comparable civilian systems is only part of the equation. To be viable, 
any reforms must also carefully consider the commander’s role in law of 
war compliance.  
The law of armed conflict is a unique legal regime. It seeks to inject 
humanitarian regulation into the brutal endeavor of warfare. A person who 
has not experienced war can never truly understand the demands placed on 
warriors and the officers and non-commissioned officers responsible for 
their leadership. Military training involves developing a genuine killer 
instinct—a willingness to take life on order and without hesitation. 
However, professional warriors must be able to essentially suspend that 
instinct at a moment’s notice in order to exercise humanitarian constraint 
and preserve the critically important line between legitimate and illegitimate 
violence, the ultimate objective of the LOAC. 
The brutality, intensity, and sheer terror of warfare therefore stress the 
ability of military leaders to ensure that their subordinates respect LOAC 
obligations. Commanders, staff officers, and their legal advisors are 
expected and required to understand these obligations and to correctly apply 
the law in the context of ongoing military operations. This is not easy. 
Beyond the commander’s responsibility to know the law and harmonize 
operational decisions to the dictates of the LOAC, commanders also bear 
the additional and critical responsibility to prepare their subordinates to 
respect these obligations and to establish a command culture that prioritizes 
fidelity to the law. 
The individual responsible for molding a group of individuals into an 
efficient and effective military unit is the commander. The commander 
holds a unique position in a military organization. Primarily through the use 
of positive leadership and example, the commander sets the tone for the 
unit. He ensures that the soldiers under his command are well trained and 
prepared to conduct military operations and achieve the unit’s objectives. 
The commander is the focal point of military discipline and order within the 
unit. He is responsible for maintaining command and control over his 
subordinate forces. The commander stands on the line that separates a 
disciplined military unit from a lawless mob. Through the use of all 
available resources, to include moral authority, law, and collective purpose, 
the military commander makes sure his forces effectively execute military 
operations—which often involve the decisive application of deadly combat 
power—in a manner that fully complies with the LOAC. When military 
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units fail to do so, it is in large measure attributable to the commander’s 
failings. 
A commander can fail in this most vital responsibility in any number of 
ways. There are situations when the commander’s actions are directly 
responsible for the LOAC violations committed by his forces. For example, 
if a commander participates with his forces in the unlawful targeting and 
killing of civilians, he is directly and criminally liable under the LOAC for 
the resulting harm. Likewise, a commander who orders his forces to attack a 
protected place is, as a result of ordering unlawful conduct, responsible for 
the subsequent LOAC violation as if he had executed the attack himself. 
Similarly, a commander who encourages his forces to kill or otherwise 
mistreat prisoners of war, or a commander who assists his subordinates in 
covering up evidence of a past war crime, is criminally liable for those 
LOAC violations. In these examples, the commander’s complicity with an 
LOAC violation is direct and punishable through the application of 
accomplice liability theory. However, even if the commander’s involvement 
is not direct, it is easy to see how his encouragement and assistance can 
contribute to LOAC violations, rendering him equally culpable. 
There are numerous possible scenarios where a commander’s action or 
inaction can have a close and direct nexus to the war crimes committed by 
subordinates. Even if a commander did not directly order forces under his 
command to engage in conduct in violation of the LOAC, he may have 
permitted or acquiesced in those violations. This can include situations 
where the commander has firsthand knowledge of the offenses and allows 
those offences to occur or to continue to occur over time. In this situation, 
the nexus between commander inaction and a subordinate’s war crime 
exists because soldiers frequently and unquestionably interpret the 
commander’s inaction and acquiescence as approval and permission. 
One of the most important components of the LOAC, therefore, is the 
mechanism that evolved to hold commanders accountable in those instances 
where the commander’s direct participation, encouragement, incitement, 
involvement, knowledge and/or acquiescence in LOAC violations is either 
direct, or where the nexus between the commander’s actions and the crime 
is clear. Even if the commander’s involvement was less direct, such as 
ordering his forces to commit unlawful killings but not directly participating 
in those killings, the doctrine of accomplice liability would provide a solid 
basis for criminal accountability. If a commander ordered, encouraged, or 
otherwise supported his forces in committing war crimes, and shared in the 
criminal purpose or design of the perpetrators and his action or failure to act 
aids, abets, counsels, or commands the perpetrator to commit the offense, 
then the commander could be guilty as a principal.171 
 
  
 171. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 877, art. 77 (1956). 
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A. The Command Responsibility Doctrine 
None of this is in any way remarkable. It is merely an application of 
traditional accomplice liability principles to the war crimes context, whether 
the offense is charged as a war crime or a violation of the U.S. military 
code. Because the LOAC implicitly relies so heavily on commanders 
executing their responsibilities, it should be apparent why legal mechanisms 
have been put into place to hold commanders accountable when evidence 
establishes the commander is either directly involved in LOAC violations or 
that he acceded as an accomplice or an accessory. Without such legal 
mechanisms, LOAC principles would be largely ineffective and 
unenforceable. These mechanisms also provide powerful incentives for the 
commander to fulfill his responsibilities to ensure compliance with LOAC 
obligations. 
This legal structure would be incomplete, however, if these were the only 
mechanisms available to establish command responsibility for LOAC 
violations. Direct liability, accomplice liability, and the liability of an 
accessory only address situations of commander complicity; where the 
evidence establishes the commander has some independent or shared intent 
to commit war crimes or prevent their detection. Punishing commanders in 
these situations will certainly deter such complicity, but will not necessarily 
incentivize the creation of a command culture that emphasizes LOAC 
compliance and condemns violations.  
How does the law address situations where a commander’s dereliction of 
duty contributes to subordinate LOAC violations? What about a commander 
who remains willfully ignorant of battlefield reports indicating LOAC 
violations, or who upon receiving such reports, fails to take appropriate 
remedial action? In these instances, it is the lack of action that contributes to 
subordinate violations, often without any intent to violate the LOAC by the 
commander himself. And yet, in such instances, the commander’s failings 
may set the conditions for the commission of war crimes by the forces under 
his command. As the individual in the critical position directly responsible 
for ensuring LOAC compliance within a military unit, should commanders 
bear responsibility when the risk becomes reality? 
The answer comes from the doctrine of command responsibility, 
developed in customary international law. Its purpose was to align the scope 
of a commander’s criminal accountability for war crimes committed by 
subordinates with the full extent of the commander’s obligation to ensure 
subordinate compliance with the law. Accordingly, the doctrine accounts for 
two situations: first, where a commander’s responsibility for war crimes is 
established by traditional complicity principles; second, where the 
commander may not have been complicit in the war crimes in the traditional 
sense, but rather was derelict in his duties to ensure respect for the law by 
the forces under his command. If evidence establishes the commander’s 
dereliction under this second prong of the doctrine, criminal responsibility 
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may be imputed to the commander for the war crimes committed by his 
soldiers; in other words, the commander is punished as if he had committed 
those crimes, not merely for his dereliction of duty as a commanding 
officer. Extending a commander’s legal responsibility for subordinate 
misconduct beyond situations of traditional complicity ultimately provides a 
necessary incentive to train, monitor, supervise, and correct subordinates, 
and in so doing, to establish a command culture of commitment to 
compliance with the law of armed conflict. 
Command responsibility was firmly established as a legal doctrine in the 
war crimes tribunals following World War II. However, the idea of holding 
a commander responsible for his subordinates’ criminal and law of war 
violations had much earlier origins in foreign, domestic, and international 
law. Military codes on occasion included provisions imposing what was in 
effect command responsibility. One of the most frequently cited examples is 
the Ordinance of Orleans, issued in 1439 by Charles VII of France.172 The 
Lieber Code developed in the American Civil War is yet another example. 
Article 71 of the Lieber Code established that: 
Whosoever intentionally inflicts additional wounds on an enemy already 
wholly disabled, or kills such an enemy, or who orders or encourages 
soldiers to do so,  shall suffer death, if duly convicted, whether he 
belongs to the Army of the United States, or is an enemy captured after 
having committed his misdeed.173 
The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 respecting the laws and customs 
of war on land was the first modern treaty to impose a form of command 
responsibility as a matter of express international legal obligation. Article 3 
states, “A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said 
Regulations shall, if the case demands, be liable to pay compensation. It 
shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons forming part of its 
  
 172. The ordinance provided: 
The King orders that each captain or lieutenant be held responsible 
for the abuses, ills, and offences committed by members of his 
company, and that as soon as he receives any complaint concerning 
any such misdeed or abuse, he bring the offender to justice so that 
the said offender be punished in a manner commensurate with his 
offence, according to these Ordinances. If he fails to do so or covers 
up the misdeed or delays taking action, or if, because of his 
negligence or otherwise, the offender escapes and thus evades 
punishment, the captain shall be deemed responsible for the offence 
as if he had committed it himself and shall be punished in the same 
way as the offender would have been.  
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armed forces.”174 The underlying premise of the modern command 
responsibility doctrine is also reflected in Chapter 1, Article 1, which 
established what is recognized as a key characteristic of an army or other 
organized militia: The military organization is “commanded by a person 
responsible for his subordinates.”175 
There are a number of commonalities among these historical antecedents 
to the contemporary command responsibility doctrine. First, they all 
recognize the unique position a commander holds in a military organization. 
Second, they all reflect the axiom that command authority includes both the 
legal authority and the legal obligation to control subordinate conduct in 
order to achieve military objectives while respecting the then existing 
humanitarian limits on the conduct of hostilities. Third, all of these 
antecedents implicitly recognize that imposing responsibility on the 
commander for the conduct of subordinates enhances the probability of such 
respect. These antecedents also recognize that a commander can be held 
accountable for his subordinates’ law of war violations if he was directly 
involved, or even in some cases where the commander’s involvement was 
less direct or obvious. From this foundation, the modern doctrine of 
command responsibility emerged at the end of World War II. 
The most well-known case involving the command responsibility 
doctrine was the trial of General Yamashita. At the end of World War II, 
General Yamashita was the Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army 
Group of the Imperial Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands. The 
Japanese government placed General Yamashita in command of these 
forces just ten days before the American forces landed in the Philippines. 
General Yamashita was in command during a desperate time for the 
Japanese forces fighting a delaying action all across the Philippines. In 
Manila, Japanese army and naval forces turned the city into a battlefield, 
and were responsible for the death of an estimated 100,000 Filipino 
civilians. These forces also committed other atrocities including thousands 
of rapes and other serious war crimes. 
The prosecution theory was that these violations were so flagrant and 
enormous that they must have been known to General Yamashita if he had 
made any effort to fulfill his responsibilities as a commander.176 If General 
Yamashita did know of these offenses, he was complicit in them for his 
failure to stop them; if he did not know of these acts, it was because he 
“took affirmative action not to know.” In either case, he bore individual 
criminal responsibility for them. 
  
 174. Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 
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 175. Annex to the Hague Convention No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of 
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 176. 4 UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, Case 21: The Trial of General 
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The military commission that tried General Yamashita rejected the 
assertion that he took no part in the crimes committed by his troops, and that 
he did not know what was occurring under his command. According to the 
commission, the evidence showed the “crimes were so extensive and 
widespread, both as to time and area, that they must either have been 
willfully permitted by [Yamashita], or secretly ordered by [him].”177 With 
respect to General Yamashita’s dereliction of duty, the President of the 
commission stated: 
[W]here murder and rape and vicious, revengeful actions are widespread 
offences, and  there is no effective attempt by a commander to discover 
and control the criminal acts,  such a commander may be held responsible, 
even criminally liable, for the lawless acts of  his troops, depending upon 
their nature and the circumstances surrounding them.178 
The key elements of the command responsibility doctrine emerged from 
this case. A commander’s responsibility and liability is predicated on (1) a 
command relationship between the superior and subordinate; (2) 
information or knowledge that triggers the commander’s duty to act; (3) if 
the duty to act is triggered, the commander must take some action regarding 
the ongoing or anticipated law of war violations by subordinates; and (4) a 
causal relationship between the commander’s omission and the war crimes 
committed by the subordinates.  
In 1977 Additional Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Convention (AP I), 
was promulgated and it included the first express treaty provision 
establishing individual criminal command responsibility.179 The doctrine of 
command responsibility is central to AP I’s accountability framework. 
Articles 86 and 87 made significant contributions to the command 
responsibility doctrine via the articulation of the specific duties for a 
commander to ensure law of war compliance. Under Article 86, paragraph 
2, the commander has the duty to prevent and repress breaches of AP I and 
the Conventions.180 Article 87, paragraph 1, imposes a duty on commanders 
to prevent, suppress, and report breaches to the Convention. Article 87, 
paragraph 3, requires a commander to prevent violations; otherwise, he 
should take penal or disciplinary actions in response to past violations if he 
is aware that his forces are going to commit or have committed a breach.181 
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Collectively, the commander’s duties are to (1) prevent future war crimes, 
(2) suppress or stop ongoing crimes, and (3) report and punish past crimes. 
The proceedings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 
(ICTR) initiated the contemporary evolution of the command responsibility 
doctrine. The command responsibility provision in the statutes for each 
tribunal, promulgated in 1993 and 1994 respectively, are virtually identical. 
Article 7(3) of the ICTY states: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 and 5 of the present 
Statute [Grave Breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Crimes 
Against Humanity] was committed by a subordinate does not relieve his 
superior of criminal liability if he knew or had reason to know that the 
subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done so and the superior 
failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts 
or to punish the perpetrators thereof.182 
Article 6(3) of the ICTR states: 
The fact that any of the acts referred to in articles 2 and 4 of the present 
Statute [Genocide and Violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva 
Conventions and  Additional Protocol II] was committed by a 
subordinate does not relieve his or her  superior of criminal liability if he 
or she knew or had reason to know that the subordinate was about to 
commit such acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the 
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the 
perpetrators thereof.183 
The most recent international codification of command responsibility 
doctrine is the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC). The 
Rome Statute sets forth ICC’s authority, vesting the Court with jurisdiction 
for cases involving genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the 
crime of aggression. Article 28 of the Rome Statute is entitled 
“Responsibility of Commanders and Other Superiors” and provides: 
(a) A military commander or person effectively acting as a military 
commander  shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court committed  by forces under his or her effective 
command and control, or effective authority and  control as the case may 
be, as a result of his or her failure to exercise control properly over such 
forces, where: 
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(i) That military commander or person either knew or, owing to the 
circumstances at the time, should have known that the forces were 
committing or about to commit such crimes; and 
(ii) That military commander or person failed to take all necessary and 
reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their 
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for 
investigation and prosecution. 
(b) With respect to superior and subordinate relationships not described in 
 paragraph (a), a superior shall be criminally responsible for crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the Court committed by subordinates under his or her 
effective authority and control, as a result of his or her failure to exercise 
control properly over such subordinates, where: 
(i) The superior either knew, or consciously disregarded information 
which clearly indicated, that the subordinates were committing or about to 
commit such  crimes; 
(ii) The crimes concerned activities that were within the effective 
responsibility and control of the superior; and 
(iii) The superior failed to take all necessary and reasonable measures 
within his or her power to prevent or repress their commission or to submit 
the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution.184 
The Rome Statute explicitly provides that a culpable commander “shall 
be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control . . . .” 
This is merely a reflection of the traditional scope of command 
responsibility, holding the commander accountable not merely for a 
dereliction, but for the offenses caused by that dereliction. Since Yamashita, 
this concept has been a key component of the doctrine; however, the Rome 
Statute is the first specific codification of this imputed liability theory under 
international law. 
B. Command Responsibility and the Role of the Commander in 
Military Justice 
The doctrine of command responsibility reflected in both customary law 
and various international treaties and statues, has important implications on 
the role of the commander with respect to military justice. Commanders are 
expected to control the forces under their command. They are expected to 
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train their forces to comply with the laws of war. They are expected to 
assert positive leadership over their forces and to be fully engaged in 
combat operations. Most importantly commanders must prevent, suppress, 
and punish the forces under their command for law of war violations. If the 
commander fails in any of these duties, ether due to negligence or willful 
blindness, the commander may be held personally liable for the crimes 
committed by his subordinate forces.  
If reforms and efforts to civilianize military justice systems reduce the 
commander’s role in the system, then what are the consequences to his 
liability and responsibility under the doctrine of command responsibility? If 
commanders lose a significant portion of the disciplinary authority they 
have traditionally held, do they no longer occupy that critical position of 
responsibility over the forces under their command? The efforts over the 
past several years to reform military justice based on human rights and 
separation of power principles have not focused on how these reforms could 
impact the commander’s obligations with respect to the law of armed 
conflict and the doctrine of command responsibility.  
IV. REFORM EFFORTS AND THE ESSENCE OF COMMAND 
As noted above, the reforms in the United Kingdom and Canada came as 
result of court cases. The court opinions, which triggered the changes to 
military justice focused almost exclusively on how the military justice 
systems compared to their respective civilian systems. The courts in these 
instances found that because the military systems departed in significant 
ways from the civilian systems without any clear justification, they were 
fundamentally unfair. Likewise, the reform efforts in Australia and the calls 
for reform in the United States have focused on the comparative differences 
between the civilian and military systems.   
This civilian focus can be seen most clearly in the reforms themselves. In 
Canada and the United Kingdom for example, the commander has been 
essentially removed from the charging and convening process. These 
functions are now performed by offices that are independent from the 
commander.  
Similarly, calls for reform in the United States and efforts at reform in 
Australia seek to give military judges more authority and independence; the 
kind of authority and independence that judges in civilian courts enjoy. In 
addition, reformers in the United States want to abolish summary courts 
because of the control and influence the commander has over the process. 
These and other reforms noted above all have in common a desire to remove 
the commander from the military justice process because of concerns about 
command influence and the potential unfairness that can result, especially 
when compared with the counterpart civilian systems.  
There is little indication, however, that courts and reformers gave much 
if any consideration to how changes and reforms might impact the 
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commander’s responsibilities under the law of armed conflict. None of the 
opinions in the European Court of Human Rights or in the Canadian 
Supreme Court make any mention of the doctrine of command 
responsibility or what the commander’s obligations are under that doctrine. 
Nor do the opinions consider how the military justice system and the 
commander’s involvement in that system can aid the commander in meeting 
these obligations.  
Failure to consider these impacts does not necessarily invalidate all or 
most of the reforms to military justice. However, disregarding or ignoring 
the relationship between military justice and the commander’s obligations 
under the law of armed conflict can undermine reform efforts and create 
unintended consequences. Some questions raised by these reforms relating 
to command responsibility include: Can the office of the Director of 
Military Prosecutions or the Chief Military Judge be held criminally liable if 
he either fails to prosecute or fails to convene a court-martial to try service 
members for law of war violations? Must these or similarly situated officials 
be consulted and involved in the training of service members and in the 
planning of military operations because they now have the responsibility for 
prosecuting and convening courts for war violations? Does the commander, 
who has lost some of his authority by losing the ability to maintain 
discipline through the military justice system find himself in a situation 
where he is given responsibility to maintain discipline and control without 
having sufficient authority to meet that obligation? Is the commander still 
likely to be held criminally liable for failings that are now beyond his 
control? Are the military forces less likely to respect and abide by the 
directions and commands of an officer who they know has little ability to 
punish them for their misconduct? What are the essential roles that a 
commander must perform in military justice? Under the law of armed 
conflict what are the functions of the commander that cannot be derogated 
to others? These questions have not been the focus of reform efforts up to 
this point.  
If the commander is accountable for taking all reasonable and necessary 
measures to prevent, suppress and punish war crimes committed by 
subordinate forces, and if the commander has an affirmative duty to know 
what subordinate forces are doing during military operations, then there are 
certain obligations that are non-delegable. These non-delegable obligations 
include disciplining subordinates and understanding both the context of 
misconduct and its impact on order and discipline within the unit, 
establishing and modeling respect for the rule of law, specifically the 
obligations of the law of armed conflict, training subordinates on law of war 
compliance, and ensuring that operations are conducted in compliance with 
the law of armed conflict. There certainly may be other important command 
functions, but these represent the core functions of command as it relates to 
compliance with the law of armed conflict. We will look at each of these 
functions separately.  
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A. The Commander as the Source of Discipline  
It is axiomatic that if the commander is potentially responsible for the 
war crimes committed by subordinate forces, then the commander must 
have the ability to discipline those subordinates in order to prevent, suppress 
and punish law of war violations. Without this ability, any demands 
imposed by the commander to abide by the law will ring hallow. If 
subordinates are not accountable to the commander, then they will have 
little incentive to comply with the commander’s orders to conduct military 
operations in accordance with the law. Even in the best of times, it can be 
challenging for the commander to get his subordinates to comply with all 
legal requirements through the tenants of positive leadership alone. For at 
least some members of the military unit, only the possibility of criminal and 
other disciplinary sanctions will incentivize them to obey. During military 
operations, these challenges are exacerbated, and it is essential that the 
commander has disciplinary authority so that the subordinates know the 
commander has the authority to enforce compliance.  
In conjunction with the authority to discipline, the commander is often in 
the best position to understand the context in which alleged misconduct took 
place. There is certainly the real risk that a commander may seek to cover-
up misconduct out of fear that it will bring disrepute to the unit or subject 
the unit to additional investigations. Examples abound where commanders 
have attempted to cover-up war crimes committed by subordinates. That 
does not mean that commanders lack the ability and responsibility for 
putting potential misconduct in its proper context or applying the 
disciplinary tools that will best ensure good order and discipline. 
At times for example, the commander may appropriately employ 
seemingly severe disciplinary tools because the commander understands 
that unless the misconduct is dealt with strongly, there is a danger that 
others in the unit will engage in similar misconduct. At other times, the 
commander may realize that a severe response is unwarranted due to 
mitigating factors that arise in combat. And the command responsibility 
doctrine already takes into account those instances where the commander 
attempts to cover-up misconduct. The commander can he held liable for 
failing to punish the misconduct.  
The ability to assess how a service member’s alleged misconduct will 
impact unit cohesion is an essential part of what it means to be a 
commander. This responsibility cannot be delegated to another office or 
officer for the simple reason that the commander is in the unique position of 
ensuring good order and discipline within the ranks of his subordinate 
forces. The primary reason for the command responsibility doctrine is to 
identify the commander as the one person in the military unit who can best 
assure law of war compliance. If the disciplinary tools are taken away from 
the commander and he is no longer able to exercise this important authority, 
then we have in essence given the commander all of the responsibility for 
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ensuring law of war compliance without giving him the necessary authority 
to carry out those obligations.  
B. Establishing and Modeling Respect for the Rule of Law  
In addition to disciplinary authority, commanders can best ensure law of 
war compliance through positive leadership, modeling appropriate respect 
for the rule of law in the commander’s own conduct. This modeling occurs 
in a number of ways. The most obvious is in training and preparing forces to 
comply with the laws of war in the context of military operations. Perhaps 
the least effective way to accomplish this is to simply ask the unit’s legal 
advisor to brief members of the command on the requirements of the law of 
war. A commander who opts for this approach may meet the minimal 
requirements but has done little to help the unit understand how the law 
applies in context. Such an approach also sends a message to the unit that 
the commander views these rules as obligations that the military is forced to 
comply with. Worse still is the commander who denigrates these obligations 
to his subordinates. Telford Taylor, the United States chief prosecutor at the 
Nuremberg tribunals said of this kind of training, “of what use is an hour or 
two of lectures on the Geneva Conventions if the solider sent into combat 
sees them flouted on every side?”185  
On the other had, commanders who understand both the legal obligations 
and the rationale behind these obligations, will seek to provide robust, 
contextualized and realistic training to subordinates. The commander will 
look for opportunities to raise law of war compliance issues throughout the 
full spectrum of military operations and demonstrate the priority he places 
on following the law. 
Regardless of the approach a particular commander takes, the point is 
simply that the commander holds a unique position within the unit. He can 
do more than any other single official to either create an environment where 
compliance with the law of war is a fundamental aspect of every military 
operation, or he can create an environment where compliance with the law 
of war is an external obligation that gets in the way of mission 
accomplishment. The responsibility for setting the tone on this issue cannot 
be delegated to others. The command responsibility doctrine recognizes that 
essential aspect of command, and if the military justice system does not 
support the commander’s ability to set the appropriate tone for law of war 
compliance, there is a risk that subordinates will disregard their legal 
obligations.  
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C. Ensuring that Operations are Conducted in Compliance with the 
Law of Armed Conflict 
In addition to establishing and modeling respect for the rule of law, the 
commander is ultimately responsible to ensure that all military operations 
comply with the laws of war. Beginning in the 20th Century in particular, 
the development of the law of war and the need for commanders to ensure 
their forces comply with the law has increasingly become a significant 
demand on a commander’s time and resources.  
It will never be easy for a commander operating in a combat 
environment to place a high priority on law of war compliance, but that is 
exactly what is expected of the commander. Among all of the competing 
demands placed on a commander, law of war compliance must be a top 
priority. That is the rationale behind the command responsibility doctrine. 
By holding the commander responsible and accountable for preventing, 
suppressing, and punishing law of war violations, the doctrine incentivizes 
the commander to make compliance with the law of war a key component 
of any military operation. It is critical that any military justice reforms do 
not unintentionally take that incentive away from the commander or dilute 
the applicability of the command responsibility doctrine. There is simply no 
one else in the military unit who can be delegated the primary responsibility 
of ensuring law of war compliance. If law of war compliance is not a top 
priority for the commander, it will not be a top priority for the military unit.  
V. ESSENTIAL AREAS OF INVOLVEMENT 
In light of the critical role that the commander must play to ensure law of 
war compliance and the responsibilities that cannot be delegated to someone 
other than the commander, the critical question, and the one that has not yet 
been fully explored by most reformists is; in what ways can a military 
justice system be reformed while preserving these essential aspects of 
command? This final section explores this question and it does so by 
focusing on a number of reforms that have been proposed to the military 
justice system in the United States. As noted above, some of these reforms 
have already been adopted by other countries. In those instances the 
question is whether some of these reforms should be reconsidered.  
We will look at five areas that have been the focus of advocates for 
reform in the United States. These areas are; the commander’s investigating 
authority, the commander’s role in convening courts-martial and exercising 
clemency, summary courts and the commander’s ability to impose summary 
punishment, the role for military judges in the pre-referral phase of a court-
martial, and tenure for military judges. There are certainly other possible 
reforms and this is not an exhaustive list. However, these reforms look at 
those functions where the commander has the greatest involvement in the 
process and these specific areas are at the intersection of military justice 
reform and the commander’s obligations under the law of armed conflict.  
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A. The Commander’s Investigating Authority   
In many traditional military justice systems the commander has the 
authority to initiate and conduct investigations into misconduct within the 
unit. In the United States commanders typically appoint an investigating 
officer within the unit to investigate allegations of misconduct. Serious 
allegations of misconduct are most often investigated by military 
professionals trained in criminal investigations. These criminal 
investigations do not require the unit commander’s approval before they are 
initiated. In either case, once the investigations are completed, reports are 
prepared and provided to the commander. 
A system that relies so heavily on the commander’s authorization before 
investigations into misconduct can be initiated are certainly subject to 
manipulation and potential cover-up by the initiating commander. There are 
modern examples from the My Lai massacre in Vietnam to the killing of 
Iraqi civilians in Haditha during the Iraq war where allegations of command 
cover-up and inaction surfaced. These and other examples of cover-ups and 
inaction have led to calls for removing the commander from the 
investigative process. Under these proposed reforms the commander of the 
unit involved in the alleged misconduct would not be the one responsible 
for initiating or conducting investigations. This investigative responsibility 
would be passed to some other office outside of the unit’s command 
structure, such as a centralized office of military prosecutions.  
This type of reform has the advantage of removing those who might have 
the most at stake personally and professionally from initiating and 
conducting investigations. This might lead to greater independence and 
reduce the risk that allegations of misconduct will go unreported and 
uninvestigated.  
However, completely removing the commander from the investigative 
process can conflict with the commander’s command responsibility 
obligations to prevent, suppress and punish law of war violations. Having 
the authority to investigate allegations is a critical part of suppressing and 
punishing these violations. Because the commander can be held criminally 
liable for the offenses if he fails to suppress and punish them, he arguably 
has a greater incentive to ensure that credible allegations are investigated. A 
responsible commander is likely to be even keener than an office that has no 
command responsibility to initiate investigations and discover the relevant 
facts. Completely removing the commander from the investigative process 
violates a fundamental principle of the command responsibility doctrine and 
dis-incentivizes the commander from meeting his obligations under the law 
of armed conflict. 
This is not to suggest that the commander must be the sole authority to 
initiate and conduct investigations. The risk of command cover-ups always 
exists, even if the commander could ultimately be held liable for the crimes 
because of the cover-up. The best approach is a system that gives the 
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commander the authority and responsibility to conduct investigations, but 
also vests investigative authority to independent offices outside the chain of 
command. This hybrid approach addresses the risk of command cover-up 
while still incentivizing the commander to take personal responsibility to 
investigate allegations of misconduct. The sharing of investigative 
responsibilities could be divided up in any number of ways or it could even 
allow for investigations to be conducted simultaneously.186  
B. The Commander’s Role as the Convening Authority 
1. The Charging Decision 
Closely related to removing the commander from the investigative 
process are reforms that remove the commander from having any role in the 
charging process or from convening courts-martial to try the accused 
service member. These charging and convening authorities are taken from 
the commander and given to other offices outside of the chain of command. 
The rationale for these reforms is to provide the accused service member 
with a more independent tribunal free from undue influences of the military 
commander. These were at the heart of the reforms in both Canada and the 
United Kingdom and are high on the agenda for reform advocates in the 
United States.   
Part III set out the significant responsibilities that a 
commander/convening authority has under the United States’ military code. 
Of these, the most significant is the convening authority’s ultimate 
responsibility for deciding the disposition of a case. It is the convening 
authority alone who decides if a service member should be tried and if so, 
what level of court-martial should be convened to try the alleged service 
member. Although the convening authority is required to make this decision 
only after consulting with his legal advisor, the ultimate decision rests with 
the commander and it cannot be delegated to others within the chain of 
command.  
If the commander is to maintain his role as the source of discipline 
within the unit, the authority to convene courts-martial should not be given 
to some other office or authority. Reforms that remove the commander from 
this essential function risk undermining the commander’s authority and 
violate the principles of command responsibility. It is critical for the 
commander to have final responsibility for imposing discipline within the 
unit. In order for the commander to do this effectively, he must be the one 
officer in the chain of command who convenes courts-martial.  
  
 186. Simultaneous investigations often occur in the United States military, particularly 
in very serious cases. In the Abu Ghraib abuse cases for example, multiple investigations 
took place at the same time.  
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Simply having input into the convening determination or having the 
ability to refer cases to some other office is not enough. A commander’s 
authority is undermined if he cannot address serious disciplinary issues with 
action. Imagine a situation where the commander believes alleged 
misconduct within the unit warrants a court-martial but the office in charge 
of convening a court-martial disagrees and elects to take no action. Such a 
scenario would seriously undermine the commander’s authority within the 
unit. In the future, members of the unit might question or doubt that the 
commander has the ability to punish them or initiate disciplinary 
proceedings against them. How can a commander prevent, suppress, and 
punish law of war violations as required under the command responsibility 
doctrine, if members of the unit harbor doubts about his disciplinary 
authority? The authority to convene courts-martial is such a fundamental 
aspect of discipline and command authority that it cannot be taken way 
from the commander without undermining the command responsibility 
doctrine under the law of armed conflict.  
While it is essential that the commander has the authority to convene 
courts-martial, many of the convening authority’s other functions can and 
should be given to other offices outside of the chain of command. In the 
United States’ system the convening authority has several other 
responsibilities beyond deciding who should face a court-martial. Some of 
the most important additional responsibilities include personally selecting 
the court members who will sit in judgment of the accused service member, 
deciding witness funding and availability issues, the authority to approve 
court-martial findings imposing sentences and exercising clemency on 
behalf of a service member. Each of these additional responsibilities will be 
discussed in turn. 
2. Court Member Selection 
The first, and by far the most controversial power that a convening 
authority has under the United States military code is selecting the 
individuals who will serve as the court members that sit in judgment of the 
accused service member. This particular provision was contentious when it 
was codified in the UCMJ and the contention and criticism has continued 
over time.187 It is not surprising that reformers have focused their efforts on 
  
 187. See Lederer & Hundley, supra note 112, at 645; see also Major Guy P. Glazier, 
He Called for His Pipe, And He Called for His Bowl, And He Called for His Members Three 
– Selection of Military Juries by the Sovereign: Impediment to Military Justice, 157 MIL. L. 
REV. 1, 2-3 (1998); Michael I. Spak & Jonathon P. Tomes, Courts-Martial: Time to Play 
Taps?, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 481, 534-41 (1999) (proposing virtual abolition of the military 
justice system except in time of war or other overseas deployments); Matthew J. 
McCormack, Comment, Reforming Court-Martial Panel Selection: Why Change Makes 
Sense for Military Commanders and Military Justice, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1013, 1049-51 
(1999) (arguing that the military should remove the convening authority’s power to handpick 
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this issue. It is not hard to imagine a convening authority that has a mind to 
manipulate or unduly influence the outcome of a court-martial using this 
authority to hand pick those members who will be inclined to see the case as 
he does rather than deciding the case on its merits. While there are few 
reported cases of commander’s overtly manipulating the process, the risk 
does exist when the convening authority has such power.  
In spite of the fact that this provision of the UCMJ has been a target for 
reformers for many years, the military has been resistant to change. The 
military’s arguments focus primarily on the logistical challenges of 
abandoning the current system for a system of random selection. There are 
undoubtedly some significant logistical and other challenges that would 
come with any reform. However, the question we are addressing here is 
whether the commander’s personal selection of the court members should 
be considered such an essential aspect of command that taking this authority 
away from him would undermine his responsibilities as a commander. It is 
difficult to see how hand picking the court members facilitates his 
responsibilities to prevent, suppress, and punish members of his command 
for law of war violations. There does not seem to be any nexus between this 
power and the responsibilities of command. Taking this power away from 
the commander and placing it in the hands of an independent office seems 
justified.  
3. Witness Funding 
Another significant power enjoyed by convening authorities in the 
United States is to decide all witness funding and availability issues for both 
lay and expert witnesses. Before a service member’s charges are referred to 
a court-martial the convening authority’s decisions are not subject to review 
or appeal. Once the case is referred to trial, if the military judge determines 
that the convening authority’s denial of witness funding is not justified, the 
military judge can abate the proceedings until the funds are made available. 
As with selecting court members, decisions regarding witness funding are 
ministerial in nature. There is nothing in the nature of command that gives 
the commander any special insight into funding issues. These are not 
decisions that go to the essence of command, and there is at least the risk 
that a commander could manipulate witness funding in order to 
inappropriately influence the trial. Reforms that give this authority to an 
office other than the commander do not prevent the commander from 
meeting his responsibility to prevent, suppress, and punish war crimes. 
 
  
court-martial panel members); Lindsy Nicole Alleman, Note, Who Is in Charge, and Who 
Should Be? The Disciplinary Role of the Commander in Military Justice Systems, 16 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 169, 190-92 (2006) (suggesting a random selection method for choosing 
panel members that is tailored to meet the needs of the U.S. military).   
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4. Approval Authority and Clemency  
After the conclusion of a court-martial, no conviction or punishment is 
final until the findings and sentence are approved by the convening 
authority. Before the convening authority takes final action on a case, he 
must first review the record of trial and obtain advice from a legal advisor 
on the factual and legal correctness of the findings and sentence. As noted 
above, the convening authority may dismiss any charge or specification by 
setting aside findings of guilt, change the findings of guilt to a lesser 
included offense, modify the sentence to any lesser sentence, or order a 
proceeding in revision or rehearing. No proceeding in revision can 
reconsider a finding of not guilty. In addition, the convening authority can 
grant clemency to the service member and he has broad discretion on the 
forms such clemency can take. 
Reform efforts that remove the commander from the charging and 
referral process also would take away the commander’s authority to approve 
the court-martial findings or to exercise clemency on behalf of a convicted 
service member. This authority is more than a ministerial function and like 
the charging decision, goes to the essence of command. Commanders are in 
a position to place misconduct in the broader context of order and discipline 
within the unit. A commander is better suited than any other office or 
official to understand how exercising clemency in a particular case will 
impact both the service member and the unit. The commander can also best 
appreciate the overall tenor within the unit and is best able to determine 
when clemency may not be appropriate.  
Clemency decisions can have a direct relationship to how the 
commander will prevent, suppress, and punish law of war violations. A 
commander who abuses this authority and fails to meaningfully punish 
violations can create an atmosphere of indiscipline within the unit and 
therefore increase the risk that subordinates will not take their obligations 
seriously enough to abide by the laws and customs of war. Similarly, a 
commander who is overly harsh can create resentment within the unit and a 
belief among subordinates that the commander acts arbitrarily and unfairly. 
This too can lead to indiscipline.  
Passing these important decisions to someone other than the commander 
means that these decisions will be made by an official who does not have 
any of the key insights possessed by the commander. It also undermines the 
commander’s ability to exercise appropriate control over his subordinates. 
Reforms that take away the commander’s ability to exercise appropriate 
control are inconsistent with the principles of command responsibility and 
should be rejected.  
5. Summary Courts 
A number of military systems contain some type of summary court-
martial or other summarized proceeding, which arguably allows the 
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commander to take swift disciplinary action. In the U. S., commanders at 
medium and high levels of command have the authority to convene 
summary courts. These courts are quite limited in the types of punishment 
that can be imposed. Critics of the summary court system point to the 
minimal procedural protections and the risk of undue command influence 
and claim that the system should be abolished.  
In some sense these summary courts do seem like an anachronistic 
holdover from a bygone era. However, there is a limited role for these 
summary proceedings and they can assist the commander in meeting his 
responsibilities to maintain discipline. There are certainly occasions and 
incidents that warrant swift action. A combat environment is one situation 
where the commander may need to quickly address misconduct to prevent 
the spread of indiscipline within the unit. The time and resources may 
simply not be available to provide for a more robust proceeding. In those 
instances, summary courts can be an effective tool for the commander to 
maintain discipline and send a message to potential offenders that he will 
not tolerate misconduct. This tool can support and enhance the 
commander’s ability to prevent, suppress, and punish war crimes. 
There should be appropriate limits on this authority to prevent the 
commander from abusing his power. Most importantly, summary courts 
should only be used for relatively minor offenses and the punishment that a 
commander can impose must be quite limited. This will ensure that 
summary courts strike the right balance between supporting the 
commander’s responsibilities while also protecting service members from 
unfair or arbitrary action. Reforms that completely remove the 
commander’s authority to convene summary courts would go too far.  
C. The Role for Military Judges in the Pre-Referral Phase 
Courts-martial are ad hoc tribunals in virtually every military system 
around the world. This means that unlike in the civilian system where there 
are permanent courts and sitting judges to whom an accused can petition 
throughout the pre-trial and trial phase of a case, in the military system, 
there is no court or judge with authority to decide or even consider issues 
until a court is actually convened. In the United States, before a case is 
referred to a court-martial the convening authority has the ultimate authority 
to decide and rule on all issues and his decisions are virtually absolute until 
the case is referred to trial and the issues can be brought before a military 
judge. This is particularly true with respect to witness availability and pre-
trial resource issues. This system can be problematic and unfair to the 
service member.  
For example, in the United States, before the case is referred to trial if a 
service member wants to obtain the services of an independent investigator 
to assist with analyzing and understanding complex evidence, or developing 
investigatory leads and interview potential witnesses, the service member 
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must request these resources from the convening authority. In order to 
demonstrate the necessity for this assistance, the defense will often be 
required to reveal case strategy and other case-sensitive information to the 
convening authority and to his legal advisor. The convening authority has 
the sole responsibility of deciding these questions and he typically does so 
after obtaining advice from his legal advisor, the same officer who 
supervises the prosecution of the case. Under this system, it can be difficult 
for the defense to get a fair consideration of the issues and waiting until the 
case is referred to trial so that the request can be made to the military judge 
might be too late, particularly when the issues involve investigatory 
resources.  
Given the potential for unfairness, this is an area that is ripe for reform, 
which does not impact the commander’s essential responsibilities to 
maintain order and discipline over his forces. While reforms could take 
different paths, it seems that one of the most logical is to expand the role of 
the military judge and give the judge responsibility for deciding these issues 
even before the case is actually referred to a court-martial. Allowing a 
military judge to decide these ministerial issues would ensure that someone 
with legal training and intimate knowledge of both the rules and the legal 
precedents is the one making these decisions. This will streamline the 
process and prevent the issues from being relitigated once the case is 
referred to a court-martial. It also would ensure that someone who is 
independent of the chain of command decides these issues helping to 
facilitate greater overall fairness within the system.  
Taking this authority away from the commander and giving them to the 
military judge does not undermine the commander’s responsibility or his 
authority. The commander is not precluded from exercising his disciplinary 
responsibilities. He is relieved from the burden of deciding technical legal 
issues and he is freed-up to focus his attention on the matters of command.  
D. Tenure for Military Judges 
One final reform that has been a feature in the reforms in both Canada 
and the United Kingdom is to give the military judge a greater degree of 
independence from the chain of command and the executive. In the United 
States there have been calls for some type of tenure for military judges. 
Reforms contend that tenure is needed to give the military judge the 
independence needed to decide issues and cases without fear of professional 
retribution by the command or the executive.  
It is hard to see how an independent military judiciary would adversely 
impact the commander’s ability to legitimately maintain order and 
discipline. Military discipline must strike the right balance between 
maintaining discipline and order and preserving fundamental fairness for the 
accused service member. If the commander can manipulate the system by 
sanctioning or adversely affecting a military judge’s career because the 
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commander disagrees with the judge’s decision in a particular case, it will 
have a chilling effect on judicial independence and undermine confidence in 
the system. If there is widespread distrust of military justice in a unit, that 
distrust can undermine discipline in the same way as a lax command climate 
would. Commanders do not lose any of their legitimate authority when 
military judges are given meaningful independence and are free to decide 
issues and cases without undue influence from the commander. Reforms 
that provide protection and independence for military judges do not 
undermine command responsibility in any appreciable manner.  
CONCLUSION 
Reforming, updating, and modernizing military justice is an important 
and worthwhile goal for any legitimate system of justice. Over the past 20 
years, there has been a virtual revolution in military justice reform and 
many of the most traditional and respected justice systems have undertaken 
significant changes. One overarching theme is conforming military justice 
to the prevailing civilian justice systems to a much greater degree than was 
the case in the past. While the United States was at the forefront of military 
justice reform in the years following World War II, today many reformers in 
the United States look with envy to the civilianization that has taken place 
elsewhere and are advocating for similar reforms. 
In the push to modernize and civilianize military justice caution is 
warranted. It is important to consider that there are important reasons why 
military justice is separate from the civilian system. One of the most 
significant reasons for a separate and different system is because of the 
obligations the law of armed conflict places on the military commander to 
ensure order and discipline within the military unit and to prevent, suppress 
and punish war crimes. It is critical that military justice reforms do not 
undermine the commander’s authority and responsibility to ensure law of 
war compliance because there is simply no other office or official who can 
take the place of the commander in meeting these obligations. Rather than 
reforming military justice with the end goal of making it more like civilian 
justice systems, any reforms that impact on the commander’s traditional role 
in military justice must be carefully examined. Only those reforms that do 
not undermine the essence of command should be undertaken. This paper 
has looked at a number of proposed reforms. Many of these changes have 
already been implemented in other systems and are at the top of the list for 
reform advocates in the United States. This paper demonstrates the kind of 
analysis that should take place in order to determine how these reforms 
would likely impact the command responsibility doctrine. Courts and 
legislative bodies called on to address military justice reform must engage 
in this kind of analysis to ensure that changes do not have unintended 
consequences. To date, this discussion and analysis has been generally 
absent in reform efforts and proposals moving forward must embrace the 
272 Michigan State International Law Review [Vol. 21:2  
concept of command responsibility before any changes are made to the 
current military justice system.  
 
